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PRETZEL LOGIC: THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S
APPROACH TO CONTRIBUTORY COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT MANDATES THAT THE
SUPREME COURT REVISIT SONY
Brandon Michael Francavillo'
Imagine you are a parent, working hard to raise your family on a very
modest income. Your world is disrupted one day, when a stranger
knocks on your door informing you of a lawsuit filed against you for
millions of dollars-because your twelve-year-old honors student shares
copyrighted music files on a peer-to-peer (P2P) computer network. This
nightmare became reality for a New York City family in early September
2003 when the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) sued
261 individuals for copyright infringement; this marked the first wave of
lawsuits against individuals as the music industry continued to wage a
desperate battle against music piracy occurring on P2P file sharing
services.'
The recording industry's crusade against P2P services began on
December 6, 1999, when A&M Records and seventeen other record
companies filed a complaint against Napster, a prominent P2P service,
alleging contributory and vicarious copyright infringement. 2 The RIAA
initiated this litigation in an effort to combat the economic quagmire that
the music industry has battled for a number of years.' After the RIAA's
J.D. Candidate, January 2005, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author wishes to thank his family for their love and support, Professor Susanna
F. Fischer for her guidance throughout the writing process, Professor George P. Smith II
for his introduction to the wisdom of the Honorable Richard A. Posner, Professor
Frederick E. Woods for his incessant encouragement, as well as Donald Fagan and Walter
Becker for their wit and eloquent insight on the human condition.
1. Steve Knopper, 261 Music Fans Sued, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 16, 2003, at 25. The
family of Brianna LaHara, which lives in a New York housing project, immediately settled
with the RIAA for $2,000. Id. Despite the "public relations nightmare" that ensued, the
RIAA proclaimed that the settlement achieved its goal of getting the message out that
unauthorized file sharing of copyrighted works is illegal, regardless of the user's age. See
id. The president of RIAA, Cary Sherman, declared, "We knew that the press would find
poster children as a result of this program .... But you have to choose between your wish
to be loved and your wish to survive. The purpose is to get the message out." Id.
2. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
A complaint was later filed by Jerry Leiber and others on behalf of music publishers on
January 7, 2000. Id.
3. See Knopper, supra note 1, at 25 (noting that the RIAA attributes the 31%
decline in music sales, in part, to online file sharing); Brian Garrity & Ed Christman,
RIAA Figures Show Continuing Decline, BILLBOARD, Sept. 13, 2003, at 7, 67 (explaining
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initial victory in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,4 it appeared the
courts might continue to show the recording industry sympathy and find
P2P services liable for contributory infringement. However, on April 25,
that the RIAA indicates that sales, in dollars, of CDs declined nearly 12% in the first sixth
months of 2003, compared to a just over 6% decline in the first half of 2002). Record
labels contend that file sharing is primarily to blame for a 15.3% decline in CD shipments
in the first half of 2003, which was twice the decline from 2002. Warren Cohen, CD Prices
Slashed!, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 2, 2003, at 27. The labels also attribute the closing of
1,000 record stores in the first half of 2003 to online piracy. Id. The result of lagging
record sales is massive layoffs throughout the entire music industry. See Jenny Eliscu, Big
Cuts at Labels, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 13, 2003, at 20. The industry has cut approximately
5,000 positions over two years. Id. Universal Music Group, the largest record company in
the world, announced that it was cutting 800 employees-this in addition to 550 layoffs
that the company made earlier this year. Id. Surely, Universal is not the only record
company feeling the effects of the industry's economic woes. Id. For instance, last year
EMI made 1,800 job cuts, BMG fired 300 of its employees, and Sony reduced its staff by
1,000 members. Id. As of mid-November 2003, in the interest of cutting costs further, two
mergers between five of the major recording companies were in the works. Details Prove
Devilish For Sony, BMG Merger, BILLBOARD, Nov. 22, 2003 at 1, 73. Bertelsmann AG's
BMG, which operates with the RCA/J Records, Arista, and Zomba record labels, and
Sony Corporation's Sony Music, which maintains Columbia and Epic labels, are poised to
merge. Id. at 73. However, their impending marriage awaits approval from antitrust
regulators. Id. at 73. With the proposed merger, Sony and BMG expect to realize $300
million in savings per year, despite the high cost to facilitate the deal, approximately $400
million. Id. at 1, 73. A Sony-BMG merger would boost the combined entity's market
share to approximately 27% of recorded music, placing the company on par with rival
Universal Music Group. See id. at 73. A merger would first combine artist rosters and,
many think, eventually trim those rosters. Id. at 73. The other merger in the works is
between EMI Group PLC and Warner Music Group, Time Warner Inc.'s recorded-music
division. Charles Goldsmith, EMI Group Sales Top Forecasts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2003,
at B2. Commentators suggest that the BMG-Sony merger may have a negative impact on
the EMI-Warner proposal. Id. EMI attempted to merge with Warner Music in 2000 and
with BMG in 2001, but antitrust regulators rejected potential deals. Id. The International
Federation of the Phonographic Industry reported a drop in global music sales of nearly
11% in the first half of 2003, likely prompting the industry's efforts to do whatever it can
to stay alive. See id.
4. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1029. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court
that a preliminary injunction against Napster was warranted because it contributed to its
users' copyright infringement. Id. at 1027, 1029. Napster's service was described in the
following way:
Napster facilitates the transmission of MP3 files between and among its users.
Through a process commonly called 'P2P' file sharing, Napster allows its users to:
(1) make MP3 music files stored on individual computer hard drives available for
copying by other Napster users; (2) search for MP3 music files stored on other
users' computers; and (3) transfer exact copies of the contents of other users'
MP3 files from one computer to another via the Internet.
Id. at 1011. A Napster user first downloads and installs the software from Napster and
then is able to access its system. Id. The names of a user's MP3 files are uploaded to the
Napster servers and stored in a directory of files available for transfer. id. at 1012.
5. See Pornography, Technology, and Process: Problems and Solutions on P2P
Networks: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 108th Cong. 1 (2003)
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2003, a district court in California relieved two P2P services, Grokster
and Streamcast Networks (the company that operates the Morpheus
software), of liability for secondary copyright infringement when their
users engaged in direct infringement of copyrighted music files,
dampening the RIAA's hopes.6 RIAA's defeat in Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,7 currently on appeal in the Ninth Circuit,
appears to have prompted the RIAA's unenviable strategy of suing the
users of P2P services-its own consumers-in order to deter illegal file
sharing, and hoping to educate the public that stealing music bears
serious consequences.8
[hereinafter Hearing statement of Marybeth Peters] (statement of Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights). Ms. Peters stated that "many felt reassured that the Ninth Circuit
[in Napster] had confirmed that copyright law provides an effective and efficient way in
which to address the massive infringements that can and do occur on P2P networks." Id.
"Unfortunately," Peters continued, "the Napster decision was not the final word on the
matter." Id.
6. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1043
(C.D. Cal. 2003). The court noted a "seminal distinction between Grokster/StreamCast
and Napster: neither Grokster nor Streamcast provides the 'site and facilities' for direct
infringement." Id. at 1041. According to the district court:
Neither Streamcast nor Grokster facilitates the exchange of files between users
in the way Napster did. Users connect to the respective networks, select which
files to share, send and receive searches, and download files, all with no material
involvement of Defendants. If either Defendant closed their doors and
deactivated all computers within their control, users of their products could
continue sharing files with little or no interruption."
Id.
7. 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
8. See Knopper, supra note 1, at 25. The suits against individuals are unenviable
because "[e]ven if the RIAA lawsuits curb piracy, they could also have the unwanted side
effect of further alienating an already disgruntled consumer base." Id. Despite the
"public relations nightmare" that ensued immediately after the suits against individuals,
the RIAA proclaimed it hopes to achieve the goal of getting the message out that the
unauthorized file sharing of copyrighted works is illegal, no matter the age of the user. See
id. For those file sharers that avoided the first wave of lawsuits and are concerned about
future liability, the RIAA has instituted an amnesty program, Clean Slate, in exchange for
a promise not to download in the future and to delete their current library of songs. Id. at
26. A recent PEW Internet and American Life Project study found that, despite the high
publicity of Napster and the wrongs of file sharing, 67% of swappers remain indifferent to
whether or not files they download are copyrighted; astonishingly that number rose from
61% in a PEW July/August 2000 study. Mary Madden & Amanda Lenhart, PEW Internet
Project Data Memo, PEW Internet and American Life Project, available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/pdf/PIP-Copyright-Memo.pdf (last modified July
2003). When the RIAA sued four college students that operated Napster-like file trading
services on school networks in April 2003, it suggested that suing individuals was far from
out of the question. See Katie Dean, RIAA Hits Students Where It Hurts, at
http://wired.com!news/print/0,1294,58351,00.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2004). The road to
suing individuals was paved, in January 2003, by the RIAA's victory in In Re Verizon
Internet Serv., Inc., Subpeona Enforcement Matter. In that case, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia required the internet service provider, Verizon Communications,
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This Comment focuses on the recent developments in determining the
liability of P2P file sharing services for contributory copyright
infringement. 9 It describes Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc.,"' the 1984 Supreme Court Betamax case that may guide
courts in determining contributory copyright infringement liability in P2P
actions." Next, this Comment discusses two groundbreaking cases:
Napster,12 which illustrates the approach that the Ninth Circuit has taken
in P2P contributory infringement lawsuits, and Grokster,'3 a district court
decision currently on appeal before the Ninth Circuit.4  Then, this
Comment shifts focus to In re Aimster Copyright Litigation,"5 in which the
Seventh Circuit articulated a contrary approach to the Ninth Circuit,
despite holding a P2P proprietor liable for contributory infringement as
the Ninth Circuit had in Napster.16 This Comment explores the split
between the two federal circuits over the application of the contributory
copyright infringement doctrine in the context of P2P file sharing.' 7 This
Comment argues that the ambiguity of Sony has caused an approach to
contributory infringement in the Ninth Circuit that contradicts the
Inc., to surrender the names of four customers alleged to be significant copyright
infringers of music files. In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 44-45
(D.D.C. 2003). The court found that Verizon had to identify allegedly infringing
subscribers as requested because the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17
U.S.C. § 512(h), applied to all Internet service providers within the scope of the DMCA,
not merely to those that provided storing information on a system or network at the
direction of a user. Id. at 30-31. On appeal, however, Verizon challenged the
constitutionality of the RIAA's subpoenas and won. See Recording Industry Ass'n of Am.
v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding the DMCA
does not permit the RIAA to utilize its § 512(h) subpoena process in P2P suits against
illegal file sharers).
9. See, e.g., Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal 2003). Contributory
infringement is only one of the theories of secondary liability. See id. at 1034. Two
elements are required to prove vicarious infringement, the other theory of liability: "(1)
financial benefit, and (2) the defendant's right and ability to supervise the infringing
conduct." Id. at 1043.
10. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
11. See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-21 (9th Cir.
2001) (applying Sony to P2P actions). But see In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp.
2d 634, 653-54 (N.D. I11. 2002)(distinguishing Sony from P2P actions because the principal
purpose of the service was for copyright infringement), afTd 334 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2003).
12. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
13. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal.
2003).
14. See Jill Kipnis & Susanne Ault, Foes Trade Barbs Over Future of P2P,
BILLBOARD, Dec. 20, 2003, at 5 (stating that oral arguments before the Ninth Circuit were
set to begin Feb. 3, 2004).
15. 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
16. See discussion infra Part I.C.
17. See discussion infra Parts I.B., I.C.
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purpose of copyright law and undermines its effectiveness in protecting
the rights of copyright holders.'
First, this Comment urges the Ninth Circuit to reverse the district
court's ruling in Grokster.'9 Ultimately, this Comment argues that the
United States Supreme Court must revisit Sony, by granting certiorari to
either party in Grokster, to articulate a reasoned approach for
determining the liability of P2P services in a contributory infringement
action. 0 Moreover, this Comment urges the Supreme Court to adopt the
Seventh Circuit's approach to contributory infringement, articulated by
Judge Richard A. Posner in Aimster, rather than the Ninth Circuit's
approach.21 Finally, this Comment asserts that P2P services differ vastly
from the Betamax recorder in Sony, and that economic public policy, as
well as the policy behind copyright law, dictates that courts recognize this
2distinction in contributory copyright infringement actions.
I. CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT: ITS PLACE AND PURPOSE IN
COPYRIGHT LAW
Contributory infringement has found its place in copyright law entirely
through common law.2' Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution provides
the constitutional authority for copyright legislation . It states, "[t]he
Congress shall have Power ... To Promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.,
21
Accordingly, copyright law seeks to balance "the interests of authors and
inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries
on the one hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of
ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand., 26 Congress sought
to achieve that balance when it enacted the Copyright Act of 1976.27
18. See discussion infra Part III.
19. See discussion infra Parts II, III.
20. See discussion infra Parts II, III, IV.
21. See discussion infra Part II.
22. See discussion infra Part II1.
23. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 434-35 (1984).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
25. Id.
26. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
27. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 - 1332 (2000). The Act articulates that "[c]opyright
protection subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression." § 102(a). A copyright owner obtains the limited grant of up to six exclusive
rights, though arguably more with the DMCA, including the right to reproduce and
distribute the work. § 106. The Act regards "[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner... [as] an infringer of the copyright." § 501(a).
20041
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The Copyright Act of 1976 does not explicitly hold liable a third party
for the infringing actions of another. 8 Instead, the contributory liability
scheme evolved entirely from case law and received recognition by the
Supreme Court in the early part of the twentieth century. 9 The Second
Circuit articulated the basic contributory infringement rule in Gershwin
Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc.,- ' determining
that "one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes
or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be
held liable as a 'contributory' infringer. 3 ' Thus, under Gershwin, a
copyright holder must prove two elements to recover under the
contributory infringement cause of action: knowledge and material
32
contribution.
28. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 434 ("The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone
liable for infringement committed by another.").
29. See Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 60-63 (1911) (holding that a producer
of an unauthorized derivative film of the copyrighted book, Ben Hur, was liable for
contributory infringement when he sold his motion picture to jobbers, who arranged for its
commercial exhibition). The Supreme Court has noted that "vicarious liability is imposed
in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a
species of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold
one individual accountable for the actions of another." Sony, 464 U.S. at 435. Moreover,
"the legislative history of the 1976 Act indicates that the addition of the words 'to
authorize' in § 106 [of the Copyright Act] was intended to confirm congressional intent
that secondary participants could be liable for copyright infringement under appropriate
circumstances." JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION
ECONOMY 459 (2002).
30. 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971). In Gershwin, the American Society of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) sued Columbia Artists Management, Inc. (CAMI) for
contributory copyright infringement. Id. at 1160. CAMI managed the musical
performances of the direct infringer and thus was responsible for contacting each,
obtaining the titles of musical compositions to be performed, printing programs, and
selling those programs for distribution at the time of the infringement. Id. at 1161. CAMI
was held liable for contributory and vicarious infringement because it was "clear that the
local association depended upon CAMI for direction in matters such as this, that CAMI
was in a position to police the infringing conduct of its artists, and that it derived
substantial financial benefit from the actions of the primary infringers." Id. at 1163.
31. Id.
32. See id. A claimant may prove the knowledge prong with either actual or
constructive knowledge. See id. Courts generally cite to Gershwin when stating the basic
rule for contributory infringement. See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76
F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996). In Fonovisa, the defendant had operated a "swap meet"
where counterfeit items were sold. Id. at 260. The swap meet operators provided an
assortment of services to vendors, for example, utilities, advertising, and parking facilities.
Id. at 261. The court determined that by providing the "site and facilities" for the
infringement to occur that the operator was liable for contributory infringement. Id. at
264; see also 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 12.04[A][2][a] at 12-78 (2003) (describing what
constitutes "participation in infringement"). Nimmer explains, "[i]f there is knowledge
that the work in question constitutes an infringement, then one who causes another to
infringe will himself be liable as an infringer." Id. at 12-79. A claimant may prove the
[Vol. 53:855
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Contributory copyright infringement enables copyright owners to
recover from those who assist the infringement, because of the difficulty
of asserting multiple actions against each individual infringer.33 The
cause of action intends to empower copyright owners to sue the "root
cause" of numerous infringements, and to avoid costly and inefficient
lawsuits against a multitude of individuals for direct infringement. Yet,
the rapidly developing case law threatens to eviscerate the doctrine of
contributory infringement as it relates to actions against P2P file sharing
31proprietors, without due regard for the doctrine's purpose.
A. The Supreme Court in Sony: A Guide for Courts in P2P Contributory
Infringement Litigation?
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,36 decided by the
Supreme Court in 1984, is the first significant case that bears on the issue
of contributory liability for P2P file sharing services. 7  In Sony, the
defendant manufactured and sold Betamax home video tape recorders
(VTRs). Universal City Studios, Inc. and Walt Disney Productions,
copyright owners of several commercially-sponsored television programs,
claimed Betamax users were infringing their copyrights and that the
knowledge prong with either actual or constructive knowledge. See 3 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, § 12.04[A][2][a] at 12-78 (2003).
33. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645-46 (7th Cir. 2003). The Court
analogizes contributory infringement to the tort of intentional interference with contract
in justifying why the former serves an important purpose. Id. at 646. Judge Posner stated:
If breach of contract (and a copyright license is just a type of contract) can be
prevented most effectively by actions taken by a third party, it makes sense to
have a legal mechanism for placing liability for the consequences of the breach
on him as well as on the party that broke the contract.
Id.; see also Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution,
47 ANTITRUST BULL. 423, 442 (2002) ("Chasing individual consumers is time consuming
and is a teaspoon solution to an ocean problem.").
34. Hearing statement of Marybeth Peters, supra note 5, at 2. Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights, testified the following before the Senate Judiciary Committee:
The historical doctrines of secondary liability have served copyright owners,
courts, and the public well-they provide copyright owners with the ability to
obtain relief against the root cause of a series of infringements without costly,
inefficient, and burdensome suits against numerous individuals. Without a viable
doctrine of contributory liability, this option is severely curtailed and may
present the copyright owner with the unenviable choice of either accepting
unremedied infringements or filing numerous suits against the individual direct
infringers.
Id.
35. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
36. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
37. See generally id.
38. Id. at 419-20.
2004]
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manufacturer, Sony, was responsible for contributory infringement. 9
The Court found that Sony was not liable for contributory infringement
because it had no contact with the direct infringers and the company was
neither influencing nor encouraging infringement by its advertisements.
41
The Court stated that the imposition of contributory infringement
liability would have to "rest on the fact that it has sold equipment with
constructive knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that
equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material.,
4
'
Referencing the articles of commerce doctrine from the Patent Act as
guidance, the Court found articles of commerce "need merely be capable
of substantial noninfringing uses" to avoid contributory infringement
liability, but it noted that the noninfringing uses must be "commercially
significant. 4 ' The Court agreed with the district court that the Betamax
VTR consumers predominately engaged in "time-shifting," the recording
of a television program in order to view it at a later, more convenient
time, then erasing it; the Court found this a fair use.43 As a result, the
Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, ruled in favor of Sony because
the Betamax was "capable of noninfringing uses." 44
The dissent in Sony rejected the majority's finding that the Betamax
VTR merely needed to be "capable of substantial noninfringing uses" to
39. Id. at 420.
40. See id. at 438. The district court concluded there was a lack of direct involvement
between Sony employees and the consumers who engaged in the alleged infringing
activity. Id. Moreover, the court failed to find evidence that Sony encouraged or
influenced the alleged infringement through its advertisements for the Betamax VTR. Id.
41. Id. at 439.
42. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
According to the Patent Act, "a 'staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use' is not contributory infringement. Id. at 440 (quoting 35
U.S.C. § 2716 (2000)). The Court recognized the need for the article of commerce
doctrine to "strike a balance between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for
effective-not merely symbolic-protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of
others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce." Id. at 442.
43. Id. at 423. The Betamax was used for two other purposes: "library building," or
copying programs to keep permanently, and recording programs in order to fast-forward
through the commercials. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003).
The Supreme Court held both purposes were infringing uses of the VTR. Id. The former
was infringing because it was tantamount to borrowing a copyrighted book from a library,
making a copy of it, and retaining the copy for one's personal library. Id. The latter was
infringing because it "creat[ed] an unauthorized derivative work." Id. However, the Sony
Court found that time-shifting was for private home use and was, therefore,
noncommercial and nonprofit in character. Sony, 464 U.S at 449. Although users copied
the entire copyrighted work, the Court found the copying to be a fair use in part because
the original invitation to watch was free of charge. Id. at 449. Finally, the court found "no
demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work
need not be prohibited in order to protect the author's incentive to create." Id. at 450.
44. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
[Vol. 53:855
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avoid liability.45  Justice Blackmun, writing on behalf of the dissent,
rejected "wholesale" importation of the staple article of commerce
doctrine into copyright law and articulated an alternative rule for
determining contributory infringement liability.4 Blackmun wrote,
[If a significant portion of the product's use is noninfringing,
the manufacturers and sellers cannot be held contributorily
liable for the product's infringing uses .... If virtually all of the
product's use, however, is to infringe, contributory liability may
be imposed; if no one would buy the product for noninfringing
purposes alone, it is clear that the manufacturer is purposely
profiting from the infringement, and that liability is
appropriately imposed. In such a case, the copyright owner's
monopoly would not be extended beyond its proper bounds; the
manufacturer of such a product contributes to the infringing
activities of others and profits directly thereby, while providing
no benefit to the public sufficient to justify the infringement.47
The dissent's approach provides clearer guidance to courts in assessing
contributory infringement liability for P2P services .4  While the
majority's holding that Sony was not liable for contributory infringement
was appropriate, its suggestion that the percentage of users engaged in
infringement after the sale of a product need not be a factor when
determining contributory infringement liability has led to confusion in
lower courts. 49 The clouded reasoning in Sony has manifested itself in a
split between the Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit.'0
B. The Ninth Circuit's Approach to Contributory Infringement
1. A&M Records v. Napster: Imposing Liability on a P2P Service
The Ninth Circuit was the first circuit to ascertain what effect Sony and
the staple article of commerce doctrine should have on contributory
infringement vis-A-vis determining the liability of P2P services.5' In
Napster, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found Napster,
a widely popular P2P service, liable for contributory infringement when
its users had engaged in direct infringement of copyrighted music files on
the Internet; in its ruling the court upheld the district court's preliminary
45. Id. at 498 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 491-92 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
47. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
48. See discussion infra Part III.A.
49. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
50. See discussion infra Parts I.B, I.C.
51. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
2004]
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injunctionf. Although the Ninth Circuit found that Napster had both
actual and constructive knowledge of infringing material located on its
system, "Napster's actual specific knowledge of direct infringement
render[ed] Sony's holding of limited assistance to Napster." 3 The Ninth
Circuit construed Sony to mean that as long as a P2P service remained
capable of any commercially significant noninfringing use, even if merely
conceivable, then constructive knowledge alone cannot be sufficient to
impose liability for contributory infringement. Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit criticized the district court's placing "undue weight on the
52. Id. at 1027. Napster provided a computer application that enabled its users to
send compressed digital files (MP3s) stored on one individual's hard drive and made
available for copying by other users. Id. at 1011. The Napster service allowed users to
search for files and once a user selected the desired files, the software would then make
the host-user's Internet address available to the requesting user to begin the file transfer of
an exact copy of the other user's file. Id. at 1012. This process is commonly known as
"P2P file sharing." Id. at 1011. The plaintiffs in Napster, as an initial matter, were required
to prove direct infringement before the court would consider the contributory
infringement claim. See id. at 1013. The plaintiffs had the burden to prove direct
infringement by showing (1) copyright "ownership of the allegedly infringed material,"
and (2) that the "alleged infringers violate[d] at least one exclusive right granted to owners
of copyright under 17 U.S.C. § 106." Id. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's
finding that the plaintiffs owned more than seventy percent of the copyrights that were
available via Napster. Id. Additionally, the court found that Napster users infringed upon
copyright holders' exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution. Id. at 1014; see also 17
U.S.C. § 106(1), (3). In response to the charge of direct infringement on the part of its
users, Napster argued that users were engaged in fair uses of the material, such as
sampling and space-shifting. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the
district court in finding Napster's fair use arguments unpersuasive. Id. at 1014-17. With
regard to sampling, the court maintained that sampling was a commercial use that
adversely affected the market for audio CDs and online distribution. Id. at 1018.
Moreover, the court agreed with the district court's finding that space-shifting here was
not a fair use, and distinguished this type of use from the time-shifting in Sony and the
space-shifting in Diamond. Id. at 1019; see Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond
Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing the theory of space-
shifting music that a consumer has purchased from one format to another as a theory of
fair use, similar to the idea of time-shifting). The majority in Napster noted that the
shifting at issue in those cases did not entail public distribution. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019
(explaining that in Diamond the copyrighted music merely was transferred from a user's
computer hard drive to their own portable MP3 player and in Sony the majority of
Betamax VTR purchasers used them at home without widely distributing their taped
broadcasts).
53. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020. Plaintiffs demonstrated that Napster had actual notice
of direct infringement because the RIAA informed it of over 12,000 infringing files and
internal Napster documents that mentioned "the need to remain ignorant of users' real
names and IP addresses 'since they are exchanging pirated music."' Id. at 1020 n.5; see
also A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 918 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
54. Id. at 1020-21.
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proportion of current infringing use as compared to current and future
noninfringing use."5
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit held that Napster provided material
contribution to the direct infringement of its users by providing the "site
and facilities" for the infringement, and the court drew a comparison
with a swap meet in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.6 The Ninth
Circuit agreed with the district court's finding that "'[w]ithout the
support services defendant provides, Napster users could not find and
download the music they want with the ease of which defendant
boasts."'' 7 Thus, the Ninth Circuit established a rule for contributory
infringement for P2P services that required both actual, specific
knowledge of direct infringement and the ability to block suppliers of the
infringing material from their systems." Articulating the rule in this
fashion proved crucial to a California district court's holding in Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer v. Grokster which absolved a second-generation, post-
Napster, P2P service of liability for contributory infringement.5 9
2. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Grokster: A Ruling in Favor of P2P
Services
In Grokster, the contributory copyright infringement doctrine was
tested and copyright law was successfully evaded by a P2P service. 60
55. Id. at 1021. The Ninth Circuit stated that the "district court improperly confined
the [substantial noninfringing] use analysis to current uses, ignoring the system's
capabilities." Id. The district court noted that Napster failed to meet its burden of
demonstrating that it was capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Napster, 114 F. Supp.
2d at 916.
56. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022; see also Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d
259. In Fonovisa, the owners of a swap meet were held liable for contributory
infringement when vendors engaged in direct infringement. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264. The
court determined that but for the backing of the operator the illegal activity could not
have occurred to the extent that it did. Id. The swap meet provided space to sell the
goods, utilities, parking, advertising, plumbing, and customers. Id.
57. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022; Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 919-20.
58. David G. Post, His Napster's Voice, in CoPY FIGHTS 107, 112 (Adam Thierer &
Wayne Crews eds,, 2002); see also Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.
59. See 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1037 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
60. Id. at 1045-46; see also Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 683
(2003) (stating that P2P designers have intentionally tried to evade liability for
contributory infringement). Professor Wu contends:
P2P file sharing represents the most ambitious effort to undermine an existing
legal system using computer code. The significance of P2P for copyright is
substantial. The efforts of P2P programmers have provided computer-savvy
music listeners with a continuing reduction in the costs of the copyright system,
comparable to a temporary repeal of copyright laws for computer geeks. P2P
underlines the reality of code design as an alternative mechanism of interest
group behavior.
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Following precedent set in Napster, the Grokster court held that: P2P
services are "liable for contributory infringement only if they (1) have
specific knowledge of infringement at a time at which they contribute to
the infringement, and (2) fail to act upon that information., 6' The
defendants' distribution of software, branded as Grokster and Morpheus,
accomplished Napster-like file sharing.62 Additionally, the defendants
employed networking technology that the court deemed "novel in
important respects" because, unlike Napster, neither Grokster nor
Morpheus made use of a centralized file sharing network.
63
The Grokster court based the contributory infringement issue on the
amount of control that P2P services had over their users, stating that "the
critical question is whether Grokster and StreamCast do anything, aside
from distributing software, to actively facilitate-or whether they could
do anything to stop-their users' infringing activity." 64 The district court
determined that, unlike Napster, neither Grokster nor StreamCast made
a material contribution to the infringement because neither defendant
provided the "site and facilities" for it to occur and emphasized the
critical distinction between the purported amount of control each service
had over its users.65  The court noted that if either Grokster or
Id.
61. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
62. Id. at 1032. The court noted that Grokster and Morpheus function in essentially
the same way. Id. The court found that once a user downloads and installs the software, it
"automatically connects to a P2P network (FastTrack in Grokster's case; Gnutella in the
case of Morpheus), and makes any shared files available for transfer to any other user
currently connected to the same P2P network." Id. Additionally, a user can conduct
searches and the software displays the users currently sharing the desired files. Id. To
access the file the court stated that:
The user may then click on a specific listing to initiate a direct transfer from the
source computer to the requesting user's computer. When the transfer is
complete, the requesting user and source user have identical copies of the file,
and the requesting user may also start sharing the file with others.
Id.
63. Id. at 1032. The court explained that while Napster operated a "supernode,"
which provided the means to connect users to each other, file transfers between users of
the Grokster and Streamcast programs are not transmitted through a central server owned
and controlled by Grokster, but directly from one user to another. Id. at 1039-41.
64. See id. at 1039; Wu, supra note 60, at 738 (stating that in Grokster, "[jiust as in
Napster, the court took the issue of control as the sine qua non of contributory liability").
65. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1041
(C.D. Cal. 2003). Napster facilitated the direct infringement by providing the "site and
facilities" for the infringement, and that "afford[ed] it perfect knowledge and complete
control over the infringing activity of its users." Id. Alternatively, with respect to
Defendants, Grokster's provison of technical assistance and an unmoderated discussion
forum was not an immaterial contribution to users' infringement. Id. at 1042. The court
specified that "the only 'technical assistance' that would bear on [the] analysis would be
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Streamcast shut down their operations and equipment, users of their
software would remain capable of sharing music.66 The Grokster ruling
demonstrates the impropriety of the Ninth Circuit's approach to
contributory infringement in Napster, and if upheld on appeal will further
support the notion that the Supreme Court must revisit Sony.
While cognizant that multitudes of P2P users infringe copyrights, the
court declined to hold the services liable for contributory infringement
because neither defendant had actual knowledge of infringement at a
time when they could have prevented it.67  The court found that
"Grokster and StreamCast are not significantly different from companies
that sell home video recorders or copy machines, both of which can be
and are used to infringe copyrights."6 Consequently, the district court
held that while both Grokster and StreamCast possessed actual
knowledge of specific infringement of their applications by users, neither
service provided material contribution to that infringing activity.69 As a
result, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
granted the motions for summary judgment by defendants, Grokster,
Ltd. and StreamCast Networks, Inc., and held neither liable for
contributory infringement.
that which suggests Defendants somehow facilitate or contribute to the actual exchange of
files." Id.
66. Id. at 1041. Applying the logic to the defendant's services, the court noted that
"[u]sers connect to the respective networks, select which files to share, send and receive
searches, and download files, all with no material involvement of Defendants." Id. Yet,
"[i]f Napster deactivated its computers, users would no longer be able to share files
through the Napster network." Id.
67. Id. at 1038, 1043.
68. Id. at 1043. Judge Wilson stated that the programs could be used for legal and
illegal means, the choice of which was left to the consumer. Id. Moreover,
While Defendants, like Sony or Xerox, may know that their products will be
used illegally by some (or even many) users, and may provide support services
and refinements that indirectly support such use, liability for contributory
infringement does not lie 'merely because P2P file sharing technology may be
used to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights (citing Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020-21).
Id. Judge Wilson concluded that without a significant contribution to the infringement
activity, no liability arises. Id.
69. Id. at 1041-42. The court decided that providing some technical assistance and an
unmoderated discussion forum was insufficient to materially contribute to users'
infringement. Id.; see also, supra note 65 (explaining the significance of Grokster's
technical support).
70. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1043
(C.D. Cal. 2003). The Court held that no disputed issues of material fact existed and there
was no evidence of defendants "active[ly] and substantial[ly] contribut[ing] to the
infringement itself." Id.
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C. The Seventh Circuit and Aimster: An Alternative Approach to
Assessing Contributory Infringement Liability in P2P Actions
The Seventh Circuit, like the Ninth Circuit in Napster, ruled against
P2P file sharing proprietors in In re Aimster Copyright Litigation,7' yet it
took an alternate approach to contributory infringement.7 ' The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's
preliminary injunction against Aimster, after finding that the recording
industry met its burden of proof in showing that it would likely succeed
at trial on the merits of the contributory infringement issue.73 In doing
so, the Seventh Circuit articulated a more practical reading of Sony than
the Ninth Circuit, and formed an approach to contributory infringement
that better aligns. with the purpose of copyright law. 4
The Seventh Circuit endorsed the district court's finding that Aimster
either knew or had reason to know of the direct infringement by its
users.75  The Seventh Circuit found that Aimster's encryption of the
71. 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). Similar to Napster, Aimster's server hosts its Web
site and compiles user information, but does not make copies of the traded files
themselves. Id. at 646. Downloading the free Aimster software enables a user to register
on its system and then designate other registrants as "Budd[ies]," giving the user the
capability of sharing files with them. Id. at 646. Failing to designate buddies does not
preclude file sharing, however. Id. Users list the files they wish to share or designate a
shared folder. Id. In order to make a copy of another file, a user goes online and searches
for that file and Aimster's server searches the computers of its members that are online
and available to share that particular file. Id. Once found, the server "instructs the
computer in which it is housed to transmit the file to the recipient via the Internet for him
to download into his computer." Id. Aimster is not liable for direct infringement because
copies of the songs reside on computers of the users and not on its own servers. Id. at 646-
47.
72. See Hearing statement of Marybeth Peters, supra note 5, at 3 (stating that the
Ninth Circuit in Napster and the Seventh Circuit in Aimster both found the respective
services liable for contributory infringement, "albeit through different paths of analysis").
73. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653. The court held:
We have to assume for purposes of deciding this appeal that no such evidence
exists; its absence, in combination with the evidence presented by the recording
industry, justified the district judge in concluding that the industry would be
likely to prevail in a full trial on the issue of contributory infringement.
Id.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 78-86.
75. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 650 (N.D. II1. 2002). To
support this finding, the court first noted that Frank Creighton of the RIAA sent three
letters to the Defendants informing them that copyrighted materials were available on
Aimster. Id. Moreover, the court found Aimster's Guardian Tutorial was additional
evidence of defendant's knowledge because it "methodically demonstrated how to infringe
Plaintiff's copyrights by using specific copyrighted titles as pedagogical examples." Id.
Additionally, Aimster held "online chat rooms and bulletin board systems in which
Aimster users openly discussed trafficking in copyrighted material and 'screwing' the
RIAA." Id. Finally, the defendant, through Club Aimster, suggested its own "Top 40"
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communications between users did not prevent the service from having
actual knowledge of users' direct infringement. Aimster contended that
it was required to show only the capability of how the system could be
used in noninfringing ways, rather than how it was actually used in
noninfringing ways." The Seventh Circuit rejected this contention." If
Aimster had its way, a finding of constructive knowledge alone would
prove useless for meeting the knowledge element of contributory
infringement, which is the effect of the Ninth Circuit's approach. 9
songs available for download, going so far as to compare Aimster rankings to other
rankings published by the music industry. Id.
76. Id. at 651. The court stated that "[i]t may be true that, due to Aimster's
encryption scheme, Defendants are unaware of the actual specific transfers of specific
copyrighted music between specific users of the Aimster system." Id. The court stated,
however, that there is no precedent that indicates that actual knowledge, in the context of
contributory infringement, requires such an elevated level of specificity. Id. It is
"disingenuous," the court said, for the defendants to plead ignorance to knowing about
actual infringement "when their putative ignorance is due entirely to an encryption
scheme that they themselves put in place." Id.
77. Id. The court found:
Were that the law, the seller of a product or service used solely to facilitate
copyright infringement, though it was capable in principle of noninfringing uses,
would be immune from liability for contributory infringement. That would be an
extreme result, and one not envisaged by the Sony majority. Otherwise its
opinion would have had no occasion to emphasize the fact... that Sony had not
in its advertising encouraged the use of the Betamax to infringe copyright. Nor
would the Court have thought it important to say that the Betamax was used
"principally" for time shifting,... which as we recall the Court deemed a fair use,
or to remark that the plaintiffs owned only a small percentage of the total
amount of copyrighted television programming and it was unclear how many of
the other owners objecting to home taping.
Id. (citations omitted). According to Judge Posner, the recording industry would have it
that "a single known infringing use brands the facilitator as a contributory infringer,"
while Aimster and other. P2P services argue that "a single noninfringing use provides
complete immunity from liability." Id. The court rejected both arguments. Id. Even if
the court had construed Sony as the defendant proposed, the outcome would have been
the same, particularly because the service failed to produce actual evidence of any
noninfringing uses, let alone the frequency of such uses. See id. at 653.
78. Id. at 653.
79. See id. at 651. The district court stated the following in finding that actual
knowledge was not a mandatory element in a contributory infringement cause of action:
Even if we were to agree that the encryption on Defendants' system prevents
them from having actual knowledge of infringement, the encryption scheme
would not prevent Defendants from having constructive knowledge.
Constructive knowledge may also meet the knowledge requirement of a
contributory infringement claim. Here, given the facts described above,
Defendants clearly should have been aware of the infringing activity. Such
constructive knowledge suffices for our purposes.
Id. (citation omitted).
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The district court in Aimster distinguished Sony on several grounds,
finding that its application, with respect to the knowledge element of a
contributory infringement action against a P2P service, should be
considerably limited."" First, the Supreme Court in Sony found that
Betamax VTR consumers principally were engaged in time-shifting, a
noninfringing use.' Yet in Aimster's case, there was no evidence that its
users primarily engaged in noninfringing use, nor was there evidence that82
Aimster actually was used for any of the purported noninfringing uses.
Second, Sony applied to a "staple article of commerce," ' whereas
Aimster involved a service that provided ongoing support to users by
making updated versions of software available, maintaining its system,
and controlling its editorial content; accordingly, Aimster did not qualify
as a staple article of commerce.8' Third, the district court found P2P
services, like Aimster, responsible for the "widespread distribution of
infringing works," while the infringement in Sony occurred in the home
by an individual solely for use by that individual."' Fourth, the district
court found Aimster intentionally designed to assist users' infringing
activities, and that precedent dictated that a defendant was not entitled
to Sony's protection where "the products at issue are specifically
manufactured for infringing activity," even if they can prove substantial
116
noninfringing uses for those products. Finally, the Supreme Court in
80. Id.
81. Id. at 653.
82. Id. The court noted the following with respect to the principal use of Aimster:
Absent is any indication from real-life Aimster users that their primary use of the
system is to transfer non-copyrighted files to their friends or identify users of
similar interest and share information. Absent is any indication that even a
single business without a network administrator uses Aimster to exchange
business records as Deep [Aimster's creator] suggests. Indeed, the mere
inclusion of such evidence would not suffice unless it tended to show that such
use constituted Aimster's primary use. Instead the evidence leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the primary use of Aimster is the transfer of
copyrighted material among its users.
Id.
83. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
84. Aimster, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 653. The court also noted that Aimster "is not a
discrete product, like a Betamax VCR, to be sold to customers who thereafter use the
machine as they see fit." Id. On the contrary, Aimster was more analogous to the swap
meet at issue in Fonovisa. Id.
85. Id. at 653-54. In Sony, there was "[n]o issue concerning the transfer of tapes to
other persons." Sony, 464 U.S. at 425. Yet, the Aimster court emphasized that "[b]y stark
contrast, Aimster has virtually nothing to do with private, home use copying." Aimster,
252 F. Supp. 2d at 654. Each Aimster user that shares unauthorized copyrighted files with
other users, is instead acting as "global distributor" of the plaintiff's works. Id.
86. Aimster, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 654; see also Cable/Home Comm. Corp. v. Network
Prod. Inc., 902 F.2d at 846 (holding defendants liable for contributory infringement in part
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Sony agreed with the district court's finding that Sony had not
"influenced or encouraged" the direct infringement; on the contrary,
87Aimster influenced and encouraged the direct infringement by its users.
Although the Seventh Circuit did not go as far as the district court had to
distinguish Sony factually, it still found Aimster was willfully blind to its
users' copyright infringement, which was sufficient under copyright law
to satisfy the knowledge requirement.8
With respect to material contribution, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
preliminary injunction instituted by the district court, agreeing that
Aimster provided material contribution to its users' copyright
infringement. Aimster provided material contribution to users'
infringement via a tutorial that gave "as its only examples of file sharing
the sharing of copyrighted music" and supplied a Club Aimster Top
Forty downloads list that enabled users to, with one mouse click,
download a copyrighted song from another user.9" The Seventh Circuit's
finding that Aimster provided material contribution to the infringement
was somewhat anticipated, yet only marginally significant.
The Seventh Circuit's Aimster opinion is critical, however, because of
the novel approach taken towards contributory infringement. The
Seventh Circuit found that "when a supplier is offering a product or
service that has noninfringing as well as infringing uses, some estimate of
the respective magnitudes of these uses is necessary for a finding of
contributory infringement."9' Judge Richard A. Posner found that when
both substantial infringing and noninfringing uses of a service are
because they "utilized and advertised these devices primarily as infringement aids and not
for legitimate, noninfringing uses").
87. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 654 (N.D. Il. 2002).
88. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003).
89. Id. at 655-56.
90. Id. at 651-53. The Seventh Circuit concluded that Aimster enticed users to
infringe copyrights. Id. at 651. Aimster went as far as recommending the songs its users
should copy. Aimster, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 652. The district court explained that
"[d]efendants manage to do everything but actually steal the music off the store shelf and
hand it to Aimster's users." Id. The district court relied on Fonovisa to find material
contribution:
Instead of parking spaces, advertisement, and plumbing, Defendants in this case
have provided the software and the support services necessary for individual
Aimster users to connect with each other. Without Aimster's services, Aimster's
infringing users would need to find some other way to connect. We need not
solely rely on such "but for" causation, however, for Defendants go much
further.
Id.
91. Aimster, 344 F.3d at 649. Judge Posner noted that in Sony the "Court's action in
striking the cost-benefit tradeoff in favor of Sony came to seem prescient when it later
turned out that the principal use of video recorders was to allow people to watch at home
movies that they bought or rented rather than to tape television programs." Id. at 649-50.
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present, a court should conduct a balancing test that considers both the
economic costs and benefits of finding contributory infringement.92 The
Seventh Circuit's approach to knowledge and material contribution is
superior to the Ninth Circuit's-it should guide other circuits and the
Supreme Court when assessing the contributory liability of P2P services.93
II. REVISITING SONY: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT APPROACH OR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT APPROACH?
Technology has changed circumstances, making the application of
contributory infringement unclear to courts in P2P actions. 94 Therefore,
it is incumbent upon the Supreme Court to revisit Sony and clarify its
significance.95 If the Supreme Court decides to revisit Sony, it should
take guidance from the persuasive, well-reasoned approach of the
Seventh Circuit.
A. The Sony Defense: Distinguishing Betamax from P2P File Sharing
In P2P actions, courts should consider the four factors the district court
outlined in Aimster and the presence of any of those should distinguish
the action from Sony.96 First, Sony applied only to a "staple article of
commerce;" therefore, courts should consider whether a P2P service
provides ongoing support following the downloading of software and the
sharing of the download.97 P2P proprietors generally are more akin to
service providers because they do not manufacture a discrete product,
like a Betamax VTR.98  Accordingly, they should not receive the
protection of a "staple article of commerce.
' 9
92. See id. at 649-50.
93. See discussion infra Part II.
94. See supra Part I.
95. See Hearing statement of Marybeth Peters, supra note 5, at 3. The Register of
Copyrights testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in September 2003, stating:
[T]he correct application of the doctrines of secondary liability and the Sony case
should produce findings of liability for the proprietors of Kazaa and Grokster as
well as Napster and Aimster. If the case law evolves so as to compel the opposite
result, I believe that Sony should be revisited either by the Supreme Court or by
Congress.
Id.; See also Samantha Chang, Piracy Showdown Likely in High Court, BILLBOARD, Oct.
18, 2003, at 14 (noting that when the federal circuit courts of appeal are split, a better
chance exists that the Supreme Court will intervene); Bill Holland, No Easy Way To
Resolve P2P, Industry Conflict, BILLBOARD, Oct. 11, 2003, at 95 (stating that many
copyright law professors believe that either the Verizon or Grokster decision could end up
before the Supreme Court).
96. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 653-54 (N.D. I11. 2002).
97. See id. at 653.
98. Id.
99. See id. The district court in Aimster found that Aimster provided:
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The Betamax is distinct from P2P services for a number of other
reasons. Sony is distinguishable from Grokster because P2P services, like
Grokster and Morpheus, facilitate the widespread distribution of
copyrighted works, while the Betamax did not promote the widespread
distribution of copyrighted works.' ° Additionally, it is reasonable to
suggest that P2P service developers intend to promote infringing use."
A service purposely designed to promote infringing activity falls outside
Sony's protection. 1 2  Finally, the principal use of P2P services is
infringing. 0 3 Alternatively, the principal use of the Betamax in Sony was
noninfringing.'O' Courts should use these factors to distinguish Sony in
order to preclude P2P defendants from shielding themselves from
liability.
B. Knowledge: Contributory Infringement's First Prong
Courts should enable copyright holders to establish the knowledge
element of contributory infringement by showing either actual or
constructive knowledge; in other words, proving actual knowledge of
infringement should not be a requirement.'0 5 The Supreme Court in
[A]n ongoing service to their users, including the provision of software, the
maintenance of the Aimster system, and the continuing control of editorial
content (ie. Club Aimster). Unlike the case in Sony, the instant case involves an
ongoing relationship between the direct infringers (the users) and the
contributory infringers (the Defendants).
Id. In Grokster, the district court, though it chose not to, should have distinguished Sony
because, unlike Sony, both Streamcast and Grokster provided support and services after
the point of download. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F.
Supp. 2d 1029, 1043 (C.D. Cal. 2003). The fact that the court deemed the support services
that defendants provided immaterial should be relevant for determining the material
contribution element of contributory infringement-but the support services they
rendered should have been sufficient enough to distinguish Grokster from Sony. See id. at
1041-43.
100. Aimster, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 653-54.
101. See Wu, supra note 60, at 683 ("P2P file sharing represents the most ambitious
effort to undermine an existing legal system using computer code."); A & M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 903 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (noting that Napster not only knew
of its users massive copyright infringement, but tried to increase demand); Grokster, 259 F.
Supp. 2d at 1046 (indicating that the court was aware that it was possible the defendants'
attempt to evade liability while profiting from users' infringement).
102. Aimster, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 654.
103. See, e.g., Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902-903.
104. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 452-53 n.36
(1984) (relating evidence that only 25% of consumers actually fast-forwarded through
commercials and thus engaged in infringing use).
105. E.g., Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971);
see also Hearing statement of Marybeth Peters, supra note 5, at 2-3. The Register of
Copyrights testified that the Grokster decision "departed from long-established
precedent" and adopted a knowledge requirement that "would eviscerate the doctrine of
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Sony found that the copyright holders did not prove the knowledge
prong because Sony only knew that the Betamax could be used to
infringe; but that alone should not suggest the necessity of proving actual
knowledge-there are other ways that a copyright holder can prove
constructive knowledge. "6 The Seventh Circuit properly found that a
copyright holder could prove either actual or constructive knowledge to
satisfy the first element of a contributory infringement claim."7 Courts
considering the contributory liability of P2P services must consider, as
the Seventh Circuit did in Aimster, that willful blindness of user
infringement satisfies the knowledge element in contributory
infringement actions.
C. Material Contribution: Contributory Infringement's Second Prong
The Grokster decision illustrates a second-generation P2P service's
success in effectively circumventing copyright law through changes in
computer code, and the Ninth Circuit should reverse it on appeal."9 The
case demonstrates that P2P services have learned to exploit the
contributory infringement doctrine, as articulated by the Ninth Circuit in
Napster. " In practice, so long as future courts properly distinguish Sony,
copyright holders should not have difficulty proving that a particular P2P
service has either actual knowledge or reason to know of its users' direct
contributory infringement as it would be almost impossible to meet." Id. at 2. Peters
continued:
It would encourage the kind of sophistry we have seen from the proprietors of
some P2P applications: a denial of knowledge of infringements by their
customers in the face of clear and uncontested evidence that such infringement is
occurring on a mind-boggling scale. Mr. Chairman, these are people whose
business plan is dependent upon massive copyright infringement and any
application of the law that allows them to escape liability for lack of knowledge
of those same infringements is inherently flawed.
Id.
106. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 ("If vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this case,
it must rest on the fact that it has sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact
that its customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted
material. There is no precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition of vicarious
liability on such a theory.").
107. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003). But see A &
M Records, Inc. vs. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that a
copyright holder should be forced to prove actual knowledge as long as the service is
capable of any commercially significant noninfringing use).
108. See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650.
109. See Wu, supra note 60, at 726 (observing that the design of P2P networks





infringement."' Instead, it is more arduous for claimants to convince a
court that a particular P2P service provides material contribution to its
users' infringement.
According to the district court, the defendants in Grokster did not
materially contribute to their users' copyright infringement. However, a
serious question exists as to whether Grokster was wrongly decided by
placing too much emphasis on the amount of control deemed necessary
in contributory infringement actions. ' 12  Even if that emphasis was
111. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029,
1036 (C.D. Cal. 2003). The district court remarked that Plaintiffs offered evidence of
actual infringement similar to that which was offered in Napster. Id. For example,
evidence existed that "both Defendants marketed themselves as 'the next Napster,' that
various searches were performed by Defendants' executives for copyrighted song titles or
artists, that various internal documents reveal Defendants were aware that their users
were infringing copyrights, and that Plaintiffs sent Defendants thousands of notices
regarding alleged infringement." Id.
112. See supra Part I.B.2. The question remains whether control is an appropriate
factor to consider in a cause of action for contributory infringement, providing another
reason for reconsidering Sony and its application to P2P networks. See Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 487 (1984). On its face, the rule for
contributory infringement does not mention control as an issue, but control is clearly a
factor for vicarious liability. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022 (stating that vicarious infringement
extends liability for copyright infringement where a service provider retains supervisory
rights of the infringing activity and profits as a result). Perhaps the district court was
misguided by the Supreme Court's suggestion in Sony that a contributory infringer must
be "in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others." Sony, 464 U.S. at
437. In Sony, the manufacturer certainly did not have control over the consumers who
purchased the VTR and used it for infringing or noninfringing purposes. Id. at 438
(finding that the "only contact between Sony and the users of the Betamax that is
disclosed by this record occurred at the moment of sale"). The Supreme Court derived its
authority for this finding by contrasting the so-called "dance hall cases" with the
"landlord-tenant" cases. Id. at 437 n. 18. In the former cases, a proprietor hired an
individual "to supply music to paying customers," who would subsequently engage in
direct copyright infringement. Id. In the "dance hall" cases, courts held the hiring party
was liable for contributory infringement. See, e.g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State
Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n., 554 F.2d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding a
racetrack owner liable for contributory infringement when an infringer was hired to supply
music). Conversely, in the "landlord-tenant" cases, landlords who simply leased property
to a direct infringer have been held not liable for contributory infringement. See, e.g.,
Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938). Yet the majority in Sony and Grokster
ignore the fact that courts have found individuals liable for contributory infringement
despite a lack of formal control over the actual infringer. See, e.g., Gershwin Publ'g Corp.
v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971). In Gershwin, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held a concert promoter liable for contributory
infringement for the actions of hired performers despite the promoter's lack of formal
control over them. Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162-63. The court stated:
Although CAMI had no formal power to control either the local association or
the artists for whom it served as agent, it is clear that the local association
depended upon CAMI for direction in matters such as this, that CAMI was in a
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appropriate, Grokster and other defendants have control over their users
who engage in direct infringement, and can take steps to mitigate
infringement. " ' Namely, P2P services can filter infringing content. "
Moreover, if Grokster had been decided in the Seventh Circuit, the court
position to police the infringing conduct of its artists, and that it derived
substantial financial benefit from the actions of the primary infringers.
Id. at 1163. Gerswhin suggests, and the Sony dissent agreed, that the contributory liability
doctrine need not rely so heavily on the notion of requiring formal control over the
alleged direct infringers in order to hold an alleged contributory infringer liable. See Sony,
464 U.S. at 487. Justice Blackmun stated, "I agree with the Gershwin court that
contributory liability may be imposed even when the defendant has no formal control over
the infringer." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Contra Sony, 464 U.S. at 437-38 (suggesting
that formal control is necessary to find contributory copyright infringement).
113. See Jennifer Norman, Staying Alive: Can the Recording Industry Survive P2P?, 26
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 371, 389 (2003). Kazaa was a third defendant when the Grokster
action was initially filed, but it was not a party to the motions for summary judgment and
the case against it is still pending. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1031-32. Grokster and
Kazaa are quite similar because Grokster distributes "a branded version of the Kazaa
Media Desktop, which operates on the same FastTrack technology as the Sharman/Kazaa
software." Id. at 1032. Sharman Networks, Kazaa's new parent company, like Grokster,
argues that "it has no control over the people who use its system." Norman, supra at 389.
Norman writes:
[A] recent article describing new methods of advertising over the Kazaa network
indicates that Sharman has more control than it would like courts to think.
Under a deal with Altnet, Altnet's software is automatically installed when a
user installs Kazaa on a personal computer. Companies, such as Microsoft, and
artists, such as independent bands, pay Altnet to place their material or
advertisements at the top of the results of Kazaa searches, and Altnet shares this
revenue with Sharman. The fact that this type of targeted advertising works by
responding to specific words a user types into the "search" function appears to
weaken Sharman's [and Grokster's] argument that Kazaa and its distributors are
powerless to police their system.
Id. Moreover, Alan Morris, executive director of Sharman Networks, which operates
Kazaa, the most popular P2P network by far according to the RIAA, revealed before a
Senate subcommittee that Kazaa can in fact be "configured to monetize the service and
diminish piracy-if the price is right of course." Kazaa's Endgame: A Deal, BILLBOARD,
Oct. 11, 2003, at 12. Morris would have the entertainment industry give up its control over
distribution and create a fair market for licensing of their works for, he hopes, "about
[twenty-five] cents per song." Id. Both of these revelations strongly suggest that
Grokster, like Kazaa, could prevent users from infringing activity; and, consequently, the
court's analysis was flawed. See Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1039.
114. Andy Sullivan, Kazaa Could Filter Copyrighted Music, Critics Say, USA TODAY,
Jan. 14, 2004, available at http://usa.today.com/tech/webguide/music/2004-01-14-
peerfilter-x.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2004). Two experts contended, in a letter to
Congress, that affordable filtering technology exists and it could easily be put into place.
Id. One expert, Darrell Smith, who previously supervised the Morpheus P2P network
alleged, "'If you've got computing power to do the searches, you can also use that
computer power to do that filtering directly."' Id.
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would likely have weighed the cost-benefit analysis, articulated by Judge
Posner, against the defendants."5
III. RESUSCITATING THE CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST P2P SERVICES
A. P2P Services Are Principally Used for Infringement
The district court's suggestion in Grokster that the defendants are not
significantly different from companies that sell VCRs or copiers is
unfounded." 6 As the Seventh Circuit recognized in Aimster, the amount
of infringing activity that occurs on P2P services differs greatly from the
amount of infringing use that occurred with Betamax recorders." 7 In
Sony, evidence was offered that a mere twenty-five percent of consumers
used the Betamax recorder for infringing copyrights, while
approximately three-fourths of users engaged in time-shifting, a
noninfringing use; the Court found this amount of noninfringing use
"plainly" qualified as commercially significant."8 Quite the opposite is
true of P2P services. In Napster, for instance, the district court found
that "virtually all Napster users download or upload copyrighted files,"
as expert testimony indicated that approximately eighty-seven percent of
files shared were copyrighted."9 With respect to Grokster, an expert
found ninety percent of the files shared by FastTrack users to be
"infringing or likely infringing copies of commerically released
copyrighted works."'2" Moreover, the approximately ten percent of
noninfringing use on P2P services is hardly commercially significant as
Sony requires. 2'
115. See discussion infra Part III; supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
116. See Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.
117. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 438 (1984)
(highlighting the lack of interaction between Sony and its consumers); Aimster, 334 F.3d at
651-52. But cf A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 920 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (stating that "[w]ithout the support services [Napster provides after users download
the software] ... users could not find and download the music they want with the ease of
which defendant boasts").
118. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442, 452-53 n.36, 456.
119. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902-03.
120. Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 6 n.4, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc.
(MGM) v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (Nos. 03-55894, 03-
56236).
121. Id. at 7. MGM notes:
Although the home recording of television broadcasts was itself a non-
commercial activity, the extent of noninfringing home recording meant that Sony
could sustain a business selling the Betamax even if infringing uses were not
possible or significant. Defendants make no pretense that they could build and
maintain a business if the only files available on their networks were NASA
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The Ninth Circuit misconstrued the majority opinion in Sony when it
concluded that when assessing the contributory liability of P2P services
that give users the ability to infringe copyrights, the percentage of their
users' infringement should be irrelevant. '1 2 Justice Blackmun, writing for
the dissent in Sony, recommended remanding the case for a factual
determination of "the 'percentage of legal versus illegal home-use
recording.",123 Justice Blackmun stated the following:
[I]f virtually all of the product's use . . . is to infringe,
contributory liability may be imposed; if no one would buy [or,
in the case of P2P services, download] the product for
noninfringing purposes alone, it is clear that the manufacturer is
purposely profiting from the infringement, and that liability is
appropriately imposed.
P2P services, like Grokster, purposely attempt to profit from the
infringement of file-sharers. 25  It is likely that few music fans would
download file sharing software for noninfringing purposes alone;
furthermore, services would not generate anywhere near the advertising
or subscription revenue they do if they were not attracting customers
with an extensive "catalog" of free copyrighted songs.2 6 As Tim Wu,
Professor of Law at the University of Virginia, points out: "The ratio of
infringing to noninfringing use must be at the forefront of the ultimate
photographs, . . . songs by unsigned recording artists,. . . or other noninfringing
works, many of which are available from any number of other online sources.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
122. See discussion supra Part II.C. (commenting on the Ninth Circuit's approach to
contributory infringement). The majority imported the patent law article of commerce
doctrine when it found that "[t]he question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of
commercially significant noninfringing uses." Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. The dissent noted
that the majority went farther than merely looking to patent law for guidance, by
completely importing the article of commerce doctrine into copyright law. Id. at 491
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). According to Blackmun, the majority failed to consider
whether the reasons behind the doctrine are reconcilable with the purpose of copyright
law. Id. Justice Blackmun remarked that the patent law maintained the article of
commerce doctrine "based in part on considerations irrelevant to the field of copyright."
Id.
123. Sony, 464 U.S. at 417 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 491 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
125. See Wu, supra note 60, at 726 (stating that P2P design has purposely "evolved to
take advantage of a specific legal doctrine-copyright's contributory liability doctrine-
embodied in the discussion in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, and
elaborated in A & M Records v. Napster"); Hearing statement of Marybeth Peters, supra
note 5, at 3 (stating that the business plans of file sharing services depend upon massive
copyright infringement). Even the district court in Grokster noted that it was "not blind to
the possibility that Defendants may have intentionally structured their businesses to avoid
secondary liability for copyright infringement, while benefiting financially from the illicit
draw of their wares." Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.
126. Greg Milner, Cost in Translation, SPIN, Dec. 2003, at 46.
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1. Maintaining the Ability to Sue the "Root Cause" of Infringement
Instead of Numerous Individuals
Contributory infringement actions protect copyright owners by
allowing them to sue the source of the massive infringement, rather than
suing a multitude of direct infringers."" It is critical that contributory
infringement remain a viable cause of action to remedy the rampant
infringement that occurs by millions of users on P2P networks.29
Nevertheless, Grokster has wrongly left copyright owners with the choice
to either accept unremedied infringements or file infringement actions
against individual users of P2P software.""
The RIAA selected the latter option, filing 261 copyright infringement
lawsuits against P2P file sharers in September 2003.13 ' This is an
127. Wu, supra note 60, at 739.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
129. See Hearing statement of Marybeth Peters, supra note 5, at 2 (criticizing the
"actual knowledge" standard as "allow[ing P2P services] to escape liability" in light of
"clear and uncontested evidence that ... infringement is occurring").
130. See id.
131. See Knopper, supra note 1, at 25. As of mid-October 2003, sixty-four file sharers
had settled copyright infringement claims with the RIAA. Steve Knopper, File Sharers
Settle Claims, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 30, 2003, at 20. In addition to the initial actions,
"[tihousands more lawsuits are expected in the next few months." Id. The target of the
initial lawsuits were individuals who shared more than 1,000 songs from their computer
hard drives. Id. As of October, 838 file sharers had signed affidavits confessing
committing copyright infringement and promising to stop in exchange for avoiding
lawsuits in the RIAA's "Clean Slate Program." Id. The Electronic Frontier Foundation
opposes the RIAA's lawsuits, arguing that the suits are "confrontational, not educational,"
but an RIAA spokeswoman noted that the RIAA was pleased with the progress being
made-namely the beginning of a dialogue with the public about the wrongs of illegal file
sharing. Id. Several individuals who have been sued insist that they were not aware that
they were doing anything wrong. See Michelle Delio, Rude Awakening for File Sharers, at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,60386,00.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2004). Some
individuals, for example, suggest that they thought paying Kazaa for an ad-free version of
their software was a legitimate way to purchase music. Id. Yet, Sharman Networks
"noted that both authorized Kazaa products [free and ad-free] contain an end-user license
agreement (a form of contract that users must accept before software installation can
begin) that advises users of copyright issues." Id. Moreover, the RIAA maintains that
those individuals knew or should have known they were committing a crime. Id. An
RIAA spokeswoman, Amanda Collins said, "[f]or a number of years, the recording
industry has been educating the public (with) broadcast and print advertisements about
the illegal activity that often occurs on P2P networks." Id. She further noted that
"virtually every individual against whom we filed a lawsuit received an instant message as
part of our educational program to let people know directly and that their activity is not
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ineffective means of combating piracy.32 The deterrent effect of suing
individuals is limited, since the RIAA can only sue the most egregious
file-swappers. 3 Moreover, it is an economically inefficient method
because suing individuals involves maintaining several hundred lawsuits
(or more) at a time, which can be extremely costly, rather than targeting
a much smaller number of P2P networks.
34
2. Copyright Owners' Right to Control Commercial Exploitation
P2P services seek to undermine the recording industry's control in the
commercial exploitation of its copyrighted works.' 35 Yet, copyright law
anonymous on these networks and there are consequences to illegal file sharing." Id. A
number of Republicans have expressed their displeasure with the RIAA's decision to sue
consumers, some introducing bills that favor music fans over the music industry. Jenny
Eliscu, Republicans to the Rescue, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 2, 2003, at 36. For instance,
Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas has sponsored legislation to prohibit the release of
user names from Internet service providers. Id. Rep. Chris Cannon of Utah has co-
authored the Music Online Competition Act, which would require record labels to license
music on "fair terms" to downloading services. Id. Cannon has expressed "outrage at 'the
stupidity of an industry that ought to be courting customers instead of alienating them."'
Id.
132. See Warren Cohen, Downloaders Fight Back, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 16, 2003, at
26. Cohen reports that since the individual lawsuits, there has been "no discernable effect
on piracy... [and] roughly 4 million users each week are still on Kazaa." Id. One reason
piracy remains rampant is that the RIAA pursues only high volume offenders. Id.
However, the vast majority of uploaders have no more than 200 files stored. Id.
133. See id.
134. See New Wave of Lawsuits Brought Against 532 Illegal File Sharers, at
http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/012104.asp (last visited Jan. 27, 2004) (announcing a
new wave of 532 lawsuits brought against individuals). The RIAA has chosen to
implement the "'John Doe' process," brought against defendants only identified by an
Internet Protocol (IP) address, after it lost a battle with Verizon when a federal appeals
court ruled that the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA) bars RIAA from using a
traditional subpoena process. See id.; Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet
Servs., 351 F.3d 1229, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding the DMCA does not permit the
RIAA to utilize its § 512(h) subpoena process in P2P suits against illegal file sharers). The
"John Doe" process no longer enables the RIAA to offer settlement to illegal file sharers
prior to suit, but the RIAA intends to offer settlements before amending its complaints.
Id.
135. See Kazaa's Endgame: A Deal, supra note 113, at 12. The BILLBOARD article
notes that the executive director of Sharman Networks, the company that operates the
most popular P2P service, Kazaa, is trying to resist litigation efforts in an attempt to cut a
deal with the industry for licensing its music. Id. The editorial notes: "Sharman's
endgame is pretty clear: Let free downloading ravage the industry until it cries 'Uncle.'
Then step in and cut a deal-on its own terms, of course." Id. In November 2003,
Sharman Networks announced the launch of a print advertisement campaign in major
newspapers and Rolling Stone magazine that targets entertainment companies and
consumers. John Borland, Kazaa Ads Tell P2P Users to Speak Up, CNET News.com, at
http://www.news.com/2102-1027-3-5108252.html?tag=st-util.print (last modified Nov. 17,
2003). One advertisement urges entertainment companies to form a partnership with
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fundamentally recognizes the copyright holder as the one with control
over the exploitation of its works. 16  The Supreme Court in Sony
recognized the importance of balancing the copyright holder's monopoly
rights to exploit its works with the commercial interest of those to
"engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.''117
File sharing on P2P networks is not, however, substantially unrelated
to legitimate online alternatives that the music industry offers, but
merely an attempt to exploit copyrighted works, without permission, for
commercial use. The recording industry has chosen to license digital
music to websites such as Apple's iTunes, Napster 2.0, Walmart.com and
Amazon.com, but not to P2P services like Kazaa."" P2P networks are
lobbying for a compulsory blanket licensing scheme where Congress
would mandate a particular rate that P2P services would pay for the right
to distribute music."'9 However, as long as Congress continues to allow
the recording industry to control distribution of its copyrighted works,
the recording industry should have the full capacity to choose which
services may distribute-and thus profit from-its copyrighted works.
4
Kazaa to license their copyrighted works. Id. Another advertisement pleads with
consumers to "to make it clear that they'll buy content on Kazaa as readily as from digital
song stores such as Apple Computer's iTunes or Napster [2.0]." Id. Ultimately, Kazaa's
desire is similar to Napster's desire a few years ago. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 903 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ("[Napster's] internal documents indicate
that it seeks to take over, or at least threaten, plaintiffs' role in the promotion and
distribution of music."). One internal document revealed Napster's desire that:
[U]ltimately [its P2P service] could evolve into a full-fledged music distribution
platform, usurping the record industry as we know it today and allowing us to
digitally promote and distribute emerging artists at a fraction of the cost but...
'we should focus on our realistic short-term goals while wooing the industry
before we try to undermine it.'
Id.
136. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. The Register of Copyrights, Marybeth
Peters, appearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, explained: "There are some
who argue that copyright infringement on P2P systems is not truly harmful to copyright
owners and may even help them generate new interest in their products. The law leaves
that judgment to the copyright owner and it ought not to be usurped by self-interested
third parties who desire to use the copyright owner's work." Hearing statement of
Marybeth Peters, supra note 5, at 2.
137. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
138. See New Wave, supra note 135.
139. See Kipnis & Ault, supra note 14, at 5, 87. Alternatively, the Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF) calls for a voluntary collective licensing scheme that would create a
collecting society to collect a monthly fee (EFF suggests $5) from file sharers, enabling
them to download any amount of music that they wish from P2P services, and allocating
the revenue to copyright holders. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, A BETTER
WAY FORWARD: VOLUNTARY COLLECTIVE LICENSING OF MUSIC FILE SHARING 1-2
(2004), available at http://www.eff.org/share/collective-lic-wp.pdf (last visited Apr. 13,
2004).
140. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000).
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P2P services, like Grokster and Kazaa, undermine the music industry's
ability to control the distribution and ability to profit from its recordings
in unprecedented fashion.4
Experts suggest that the digital music market will grow from less than
eighty million dollars in 2003 to more than one and a half billion dollars
over the next five years; thus, clearly, the industry has plenty at stake.
42
P2P services profit unjustly each time one of their users illegally offers a
copy of a hit song to another user. By increasing the amount of pirated
music available to their users, P2P networks attract more users and
higher potential advertising and subscription revenues while the music
industry continues to suffer stagnant sales and layoffs. 43
In the context of determining contributory liability for manufacturers
of a VCR or providers of a P2P service, it is true that copyright law
should be "an effort to cure a form of market failure."'" However,
unlike the Betamax in Sony, P2P file sharing does not address a market
failure. 45  On the one hand, the Betamax increased the market for
television shows and movies (via time-shifting and rentals, respectively);
but on the other hand, file sharing harms the music industry by replacing
legitimate sales.146 The industry has achieved only modest success online
141. Hearing statement of Marybeth Peters, supra note 5, at 1.
142. Brian Garrity, How Big Can It Get? Digital Distribution May Exceed $1.5B By
2008, BILLBOARD, Nov. 1, 2003, at 63. It appears the recording industry's digital
distribution model is finally in place: the number one downloaded single has sold more
units than the number one physical single. See Silvio Pietroluongo et al., Digital Sales
Outpace Physical for First Time, BILLBOARD, Nov. 22, 2003, at 68.
143. See Chris Morris, UMG To Trim Global Staff by 800, BILLBOARD, Oct. 25, 2003,
at 7.
144. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1610 (1982).
145. See Wu, supra note 60, at 739. Professor Wu notes:
Sony, in turn, can be read as a policy judgment aimed principally at correcting a
perceived market failure. While clearer in hindsight, it is apparent that the Sony
decision correctly addressed a market failure. The VCR broadened the
addressable market for television shows (via time-shifting) and for movies (via
rentals). Though there is an argument that file sharing helps the music industry,
the desirability of the 'help' is much less apparent. File sharing looks more like a
replacement for legitimate music sales; such reasoning may compel a court to
find some way to assess liability on P2P developers regardless of the Napster
precedent.
Id.
146. Id. at 739; see also Stan Liebowitz, Copyright in the Post-Napster World: Legal or
Market Solutions?, in COPY FIGHTS 199-201 (Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews, eds., 2002)
(opining that P2P file sharing is more harmful to copyright owners than piracy that
occurred via the VCR, photocopying, and records to cassette tapes because, in those cases,
"'indirect appropriability"' was possible). Liebowitz states, "even though the copyright
owners cried 'wolf' about Betamax and they were wrong, and they cried 'wolf' about
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thus far by offering legal downloading; it has found that competing with
free P2P networks is inherently difficult. 47 The lack of market failure
and the declining plight of the entertainment industry support a need for
judicial actvsm.4
photocopying and they were wrong, and they cried 'wolf' about audio cassettes and they
were wrong, they probably are right about P2P networks." Id. at 200.
147. See Cohen, supra note 133, at 26. The most successful of the industy's online
efforts thus far is Apple's iTunes music store. Id. The online store has gone from selling
one million songs in each of its first two weeks to a rather paltry five-hundred thousand
downloads per week. Id.
148. Technological innovations have advanced to the point where the literal terms of
copyright are ambiguous; therefore, the Copyright Act must be construed with regard to
its basic purpose. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431-
32 (1984). Justice Stewart found the following in Sony:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited
copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing
claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded,
but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an author's creative labor. But the
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good . . . . When technological change has rendered its literal terms
ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose.
Id. (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)). In
Grokster, the court noted its reluctance to impose liability on the file sharing services,
remarking that "[pilaintiffs invite this Court to expand existing copyright law beyond its
well-drawn boundaries," and insisting upon the propriety of deference to Congress.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1046 (C.D.
Cal. 2003). The district court cited the Supreme Court's finding in Sony which states that:
Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress
when major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials.
Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to
accommodate fully the raised permutations of competing interests that are
inevitably implicated by such new technology. In a case like this, in which
Congress has not plainly marked our course, we must be circumspect in
construing the scope of rights created by a legislative enactment which never
contemplated such a calculus of interests.
Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 431). Yet, the boundaries of contributory infringement were
not well-drawn in Sony and are, perhaps, even more unsettled today. See Sony, 464 U.S.
at 487 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Hearing statement of Marybeth Peters, supra
note 5 at 3 (observing that the law concerning the liability of P2P services is in a state of
"flux"). Peters notes that "it is perhaps a commentary on [the Sony opinion] that almost
twenty years later, we still have such uncertainty that three courts seem to interpret and
apply it in three different ways." Id. Justice Blackmun's call for judicial activism in Sony
resonates particularly well today:
The [majority] has tended to evade the hard issues when they arise in the area of
copyright law. I see no reason for the Court to be particularly pleased with this
tradition or to continue it. Indeed it is fairly clear from the legislative history of
the 1976 Act that Congress meant to change the old pattern and enact a statute
that would cover new technologies, as well as old.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 457-58 (Blackmum, J., dissenting).
2004]
Catholic University Law Review
Perhaps it would be better for copyright law to consider the effect that
an alleged infringer's "actions [have] had on the copyright holder's
opportunities for commercial exploitation.' ' 49 This standard would hold
P2P services, rather than individuals, generally liable for infringement.'1
50
Courts should consider the extent to which those who offer new
technology profit from the direct infringement of their users at the
expense of the copyright holders. To illustrate, in Sony the manufacturer
of the Betamax was not profiting from the infringement and, in fact,
eventually the film industry realized that the copyright holders could
profit from home video sales."' Because the manufacturer did not
benefit, the holding that Sony was not engaging in contributory
infringement was appropriate. '1 2 Yet, the music industry's efforts to offerlegitimate online sales evince a lack of market failure. 53 Because P2P
149. Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, in COPY FIGHTS
135 (Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews eds., 2002) (stating that "[u]nder this standard,
individual trading of MP3 files would not be actionable, but Napster's activities would
be").
150. Id.
t51. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649-50 (7th Cir. 2003).
152. See id.
153. See Cohen, supra note 133, at 26. Besides offering legitimate online services, in
an effort to further reduce piracy, Universal Music Group (UMG), the world's largest
record company, announced in September of 2003 that it planned to reduce the suggested
retail price of new CDs to $12.98, down from the current retail price range of $16.98 to
$18.98. Warren Cohen, CD Prices Slashed!, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 2, 2003, at 27. UMG
claims that the price cuts are essential to deterring internet piracy. Id. Online piracy has
risen considerably in the past two years and Doug Morris, UMG chairman and CEO,
noted that, "People are losing jobs, and stores are forced to close. It's a sad story." Id.
While as of October 2003, no other labels have announced plans to follow Universal's lead
and cut retail prices, it is expected that several will. Id. Many in the industry "think the
price reduction is long overdue, especially considering the wild success of DVD movies-
which are often priced lower than their CD soundtracks," and retailers are generally
pleased with the move. Id. at 27-28. The new policy was intended to take effect starting
on October 1, 2003. Id. at 28. However, according to a survey of music retailers across the
country, a number of new UMG releases are still selling for about $14.99. Jenny Eliscu,
Not So Nice Prices, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 27, 2003, at 26. Because the wholesale costs
were not reduced, retailers' profits are also reduced. Id. In order to purchase CDs at a
reduced wholesale rate, UMG is forcing retailers to agree to conditions like ensuring that
thirty percent of the CDs on display racks are UMG artists. Milner, supra note 126, at 46.
While the price cut might allow national record stores to compete with stores that retail
music at discounted prices, like Best Buy, the cuts might not be so welcome at
independent records shops. Id. What is particularly problematic for independent retailers
is that they purchase product from "one-stops, which impose a middleman fee." Id. Even
if the industry lowers prices, the effect that it alone will have on online piracy remains
uncertain. See id. Russ Crupnick, vice president of the NPD Group, a marketing-
information firm, stated that one-third to one-half of the decline in physical sales can be
attributed to downloading and price is the main reason consumers cite for buying less
music. Id. Yet, Josh Bernoff, an analyst for Forrester Research contends that the policy
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services are primarily used for infringement and the proprietors
purposely try to control-and profit from-the exploitation of the music
industry's copyrights, courts must maintain the contributory infringement
doctrine as a viable form of remedial relief. This Comment urges courts
to adopt the Seventh Circuit's approach to contributory copyright
infringement to effectively protect a struggling industry and require P2P
services to adopt legitimate business models built around providing
noninfringing works to its users.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE SUPREME COURT MUST REVISIT SONY AND
RESUSCITATE THE CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT DOCTRINE
It is incumbent upon the Supreme Court to revisit Sony and discern
the extent that it applies when assessing the contributory liability of a
P2P service. A circuit split between two federal courts of appeals has left
the contributory infringement doctrine in a rather precarious position.
On the one hand, the Seventh Circuit, in Aimster, pronounced a rational
approach to contributory infringement. Its framework helps protect
copyright holders and maintains the doctrine as an attractive alternative
to suing individual users who engage in massive copyright infringement.
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit in Napster established an approach
to contributory infringement that is inconsistent with copyright law and
inconsiderate of sound public policy. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit must
reverse Grokster and reject the fiction that sharing copyrighted files is
acceptable.5 4 If Grokster is affirmed, the Ninth Circuit threatens to
eviscerate the doctrine of contributory infringement as an avenue for
combating the "the most widespread phenomena of infringement in the
history of this country."'' 5
Of course, online piracy will always exist; but unless the Supreme
Court resolves the circuit split and revisits Sony, the recording industry
will face the impossible feat of trying to contain piracy without the
support of the judicial system. While the stakes could not be higher, now
is the time for the Supreme Court to dust off Sony, a case decided well
before the digital era, and to resuscitate the contributory infringement
doctrine as an effective remedy for a battered music industry.
will not have a major impact on file sharing. Id. Consumers are now accustomed to
acquiring music from P2P services and the retail cost of a CD is irrelevant. Id.
154. See Madden & Lenhart, supra note 8, at 1. A PEW Internet and American Life
Project survey conducted from March to May of 2003 showed that of the thirty-five
million Americans who download music files online, sixty-seven percent do not care
whether or not the files they download are copyrighted. Id. Moreover, sixty-five percent
of Americans that share files online do not care whether or not the files are copyrighted.
Id.
155. See Hearing statement of Marybeth Peters, supra note 5, at 5.
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Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit's approach to contributory copyright
infringement resonates better with the purpose of copyright law and
sound public policy than the approaches of the Ninth Circuit in Napster
and the district court in Grokster.
